Seeking an End to a Catastrophic War: The Ukraine War after Three Years

The Ukraine-Russia war is now in its fourth year. The war has become, in one sense, a relatively static conflict, with neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces advancing dramatically and battles being fought over very small pieces of territory. However, in another sense, the war has changed significantly over time by becoming ever more costly and dangerous as it continues to claim lives, cause suffering, and escalate to greater levels of violence. The need for a ceasefire is greater than ever today.

The State of the War

Following Ukraine’s 2023 counter-offensive, the initiative in the war shifted to the Russians. For roughly a year, Russian forces in eastern Ukraine have been advancing very slowly. Russia also still occupies a small part of northern Ukraine, close to the city of Kharkiv.[1] In August 2024, the Ukrainians responded to Russian advances in the east with an incursion from northern Ukraine into Russia’s Kursk region. The Russians were subsequently able to regain some territory but to date have not pushed the Ukrainians out of Russia altogether.[2]

While the situation on the ground may well change, at present the war is set in a pattern reminiscent of western Europe in World War I: the two sides currently face each other along a 1,000-kilometer front that shifts only marginally over time.[3]

The War’s Toll

Precisely how many people have been killed in the war to date is unknown. Both Russia and Ukraine likely exaggerate the other side’s losses while playing down their own. A rough sense of the scale of the war’s losses can be discerned, though.

In December, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed since the war began in February 2022. An estimate by the Russian media website Mediazona, based on open-source data such as obituaries, placed the number of Russian soldiers killed in 2024 alone as at least 31,481.[4] The total number of Russian military personnel killed since the war began is presumably much higher.

 In January, United Nations deputy human rights chief Nada Al-Nashif reported that more than 12,300 civilians, including 650 children, have been killed in Ukraine during the war—and these numbers are likely underestimates. Civilians have been killed both close to the frontlines and far from them, with Russian bombing being a significant cause of death.[5] Meanwhile, almost 7 million Ukrainians have been forced by the war to flee their country.[6]

Ukrainian civilians are also suffering from repeated Russian attacks on their country’s energy infrastructure. Russia has attacked Ukraine’s power grid over 1,000 times since the war began and these attacks escalated in 2024.[7]

A major attack in late November 2024, for example, left millions of Ukrainians without power. The attack left the city of Kherson without electricity and the city of Zhytomyr without power or water.[8]

Because of the assaults on its energy infrastructure, Ukraine is in a precarious position. Since the war began, Ukraine has gone from a net exporter of electricity to Europe to a net importer, and it is currently struggling to pay for these imports. In winter, Ukraine is currently unable to supply the country’s full energy needs, with residential blackouts being frequent. Household electricity was out almost 40 percent of the time in December 2024. Continued attacks on the energy infrastructure will likely only worsen this severe deprivation.[9]

The war has also involved the use of weapons that are not only lethal in the present conflict but will have longer-term consequences. Both sides have used cluster bombs and land mines.[10] These weapons have already caused harm—over 1,000 people in Ukraine have been killed or injured by cluster bombs since the war began—and will continue to cause harm for years, even after the war ends.[11]

Both cluster bombs and land mines can remain active and unexploded in the ground for years, posing a continuing threat to people’s lives long after the wars that originally put them in place have ended.[12]

Because of these weapons’ long-term dangers, much of Ukraine’s land has been effectively blighted. Almost a quarter of Ukrainian land may be contaminated with explosives, including perhaps 10 percent of arable land.[13]

This contamination of land seriously damages Ukrainian agriculture, one of the country’s most important economic activities. Further, the effects of the damage to agriculture go beyond Ukraine. The disruptions wrought by the war have strained global food supplies, as both Ukraine and Russia are major grain exporters. Prior to the current war, nearly 90 percent of Ukrainian wheat exports went to food-insecure countries in Africa and Asia.[14]

With so much Ukrainian farmland contaminated by explosives that may take decades and tens of billions of dollars to clean up, global food supplies will likely be affected for a long time even if the war ends today.[15]

The most dangerous weapons connected to the Ukraine war, though, are ones that have not yet been used, namely nuclear weapons. Because the war has pitted nuclear-armed Russia against nuclear-armed NATO nations, such as the United States, that have been Ukraine’s leading supporters, the threat of possible nuclear war has hung over the Ukraine conflict from the beginning.

The nuclear threat moved closer to becoming reality this past November. That month, the United States and United Kingdom gave Ukraine authorization to use long-range American- and British-made missiles to strikes targets within Russia.[16]

Russia responded to the Ukrainian missile strikes by striking a Ukrainian city with a longer-range missile that, although it carried conventional explosives, could have been armed with a nuclear warhead. The choice of weapon was clearly meant to demonstrate what the Russians could potentially do to retaliate.[17]

Seeking an End to the War

In the weeks since the war’s three-year anniversary (and since I wrote everything above), US President Donald Trump’s new administration has thrown the western side of the war into turmoil.

Significant events have come with dizzying speed. Following an acrimonious confrontation between Trump and Zelenskyy at the White House, the Trump administration cut off military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine, raising the prospects of the Ukrainian war effort collapsing.[18] In contrast, European members of NATO emphasized their own commitment to continue supporting Ukraine.[19]

Then the Trump administration reversed course, restoring military aid and the intelligence sharing arrangement with Ukraine, amid talk of a possible cease-fire.[20] Meanwhile, Trump has threatened possible sanctions on Russia to pressure the Russians to negotiate an end to the war.[21]

More dramatic changes may take place in the coming days, and what will happen next is anyone’s guess. Further, what should happen next is far from clear.

The central problem is that the war’s costs and the looming danger of nuclear war make ending the war imperative but ending the war is probably not possible without making concessions to Russia. Because Russia is currently in a stronger position than Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has little incentive to withdraw from the Ukrainian territory Russia has already occupied. Fighting has manifestly not gained back this land and for the Ukrainians to continue fighting to regain their lost territory could well end up being a futile waste of still more lives.

Allowing the Russians to occupy part of Ukraine is hardly a satisfactory resolution to war. Concessions to Putin’s government effectively reward Russia’s original aggression against Ukraine. Nevertheless, I do not see a realistic alternative.

Beyond the fundamental injustice of Russia’s occupation of eastern Ukraine, the argument against making concessions to Putin is that it will embolden him to attempt further conquests of Ukraine or other countries in the future. This is a variant of the “Munich argument,” which argues that appeasing an aggressor—as Britain and France appeased Nazi Germany in the 1930s by allowing Hitler to annex the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia—ultimately invites further aggression.

I am skeptical about how great or realistic a threat future Russian aggression is, for two reasons. First, regardless of what concessions are made to him, Putin may not have much more appetite for military adventures. As noted, the Ukraine war has been extremely costly to Russia and triggered the Prigozhin mutiny, one of the most serious challenges to Putin’s reign to date.[22] This is why Putin has an incentive to end the war now, and he may well be more cautious about waging war against Ukraine in the future.

Second, even if Putin does have further plans for conquest in Ukraine or elsewhere, Russia may not have the military capacity to carry out many more aggressive campaigns. For all its costs, the Russian military’s war in Ukraine has achieved only modest gains.

The Munich analogy is illuminating in this respect. Following the annexation of the Sudetenland in late 1938, Nazi Germany proceeded over the next three years to invade and occupy the remainder of the Czechs’ lands, followed by Poland, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Greece, Yugoslavia, and much of the western Soviet Union. Shortly after that, Hitler went a step further by declaring war on the United States. In contrast, Russia has been struggling for the last three years to conquer a relatively small portion of one country in Europe. I therefore have my doubts about how much more conquest the Russian military can realistically achieve.

Having identified these reasons for my skepticism about future Russian aggression, though, I also acknowledge that the future is always unknowable. While I have my doubts, I am by no means certain that Putin will not attempt further conquests of Ukrainian territory nor am I certain that the Russian military will fail to make significant progress in any future military campaign.

Therefore, to hedge against possible future Russian aggression, the United States and other NATO nations should be prepared (contrary to the mercurial behavior of the Trump administration) to continue to support Ukraine with military aid. Such aid should be oriented towards defending independent Ukrainian territory rather than trying to take back territory currently under Russian control. The aid also should not include further long-range weapons for striking Russia. However, aid should continue until a cease-fire is achieved and should be ready at hand if fighting resumes later.

Nevertheless, western support to Ukraine should not—must not—take the form of NATO membership or comparable security guarantees. Making Ukraine a member of NATO is equivalent to NATO nations promising Ukraine they will go to war with Russia should Russia ever resume its attacks on Ukraine. This is not a prudent promise to make to a country that, even following a cease-fire, will still be in a frozen, unresolved territorial dispute with its nuclear-armed neighbor. Such a promise is placing the safety of the world on a razor’s edge.  

Given all the considerations I have outlined above, a plausible ceasefire deal might look like this:

Ukraine would withdraw its forces from Russia’s Kursk region in return for Russian withdrawal from around Kharkiv. The conflict would then be frozen along its existing frontline.

The next steps would be a gradual reduction in both Ukrainian and Russian military forces along the frontline and the two countries’ borders, with the frontline eventually becoming an internationally monitored demilitarized zone. To provide Russia an additional incentive, this demilitarization process could be accompanied by gradual relief of international sanctions.

If the demilitarization process is successful, the United States and NATO can then provide a written guarantee that Ukraine will not be admitted to NATO. However, Ukraine should remain eligible for admittance to the EU and to benefit from western trade and economic assistance.

Such a resolution would be very far from ideal or even palatable. This resolution would at least stop the killing and suffering, though, and offer an opportunity for the Ukrainians to begin to rebuild their country.

Those of us who wish to support the Ukrainian people can consider donating to humanitarian groups working in Ukraine, such as Catholic Relief Services (https://www.crs.org/our-work-overseas/where-we-work/ukraine) and Mennonite Central Committee (https://mcc.org/what-we-do/initiatives/disaster-response/ukraine). People can also donate to the Halo Trust (https://www.halousa.org/where-we-work/europe-and-caucasus/ukraine/), which works to clear explosives from Ukrainian land.

We should also all mourn the tremendous suffering and loss of life caused by more than three years of this catastrophic war.

A version of this essay originally appeared on the Consistent Life Network blog.

Notes

[1] BBC, “Ukraine in Maps: Tracking the War with Russia,” Updated November 19, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682; Financial Times, “Ukraine’s Battle against Russia in Maps and Charts: Latest Updates,” Updated January 17, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/4351d5b0-0888-4b47-9368-6bc4dfbccbf5.

[2] BBC, “Ukraine in Maps: Tracking the War with Russia”; Financial Times, “Ukraine’s Battle against Russia in Maps and Charts.”

[3] Financial Times, “Ukraine’s Battle against Russia in Maps and Charts.”

[4] Al Jazeera, “Russia Gained 4,000sq km of Ukraine in 2024. How Many Soldiers Did It Lose?” January 8, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/8/russia-gained-4000sq-km-of-ukraine-in-2024-how-many-soldiers-did-it-lose.

[5] Emma Farge, “Over 12,300 Civilians Killed since Start of Ukraine War, UN Says,” Reuters, January 8, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/over-12300-civilians-killed-since-start-ukraine-war-un-says-2025-01-08/.

[6] UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Operational Data Portal, Ukraine Refugee Situation, accessed February 14, 2025, https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine.

[7] Theresa Sabonis-Helf, “The Electricity Front of Russia’s War Against Ukraine,” February 3, 2025, https://warontherocks.com/2025/02/the-electricity-front-of-russias-war-against-ukraine/.

[8] Maria Varenikova, Ivan Nechepurenko, and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Russia Launches Huge Bombardment of Ukraine and Signals More to Come,” New York Times, November 28, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/28/world/europe/russia-missile-attack-ukraine-energy.html.

[9] Sabonis-Helf, “The Electricity Front of Russia’s War Against Ukraine.”

[10] BBC, “Cluster Bombs: Ukraine Using Munitions ‘Effectively’, Says US,” July 20, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66262164; Brit McCandless Farmer, “Ukraine’s Landmine Crisis,” CBS News, August 18, 2024, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraines-landmine-crisis-60-minutes/; Jaroslav Lukiv and David Willis, “Biden Agrees to Give Ukraine Anti-personnel Mines,” BBC, November 20, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2d1lj3nwqo; UN News, “New Use of Cluster Bombs Threatens Global Ban, Report Warns,” September 9, 2024, https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/09/1154076; UN News, “Ukraine War: Russia Used Cluster Weapons at Least 24 Times, says UN’s Bachelet,” March 30, 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1115092;

[11] UN News, “New Use of Cluster Bombs Threatens Global Ban, Report Warns.”

[12] Farmer, “Ukraine’s Landmine Crisis”; Mary Wareham, “US Cluster Munition Transfers Raise Humanitarian Concerns,” Human Rights Watch, April 4, 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/04/us-cluster-munition-transfers-raise-humanitarian-concerns.

[13] Anna Chaika, “War in Ukraine: Land Mines to Hurt Food Exports for Years,” Deutsche Welle, October 16, 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/russias-war-in-ukraine-landmines-and-contamination-threaten-food-security/a-70448256; UN Development Programme, “In Ukraine, Tackling Mine Action from All Sides to Make Land Safe Again,” October 14, 2024, https://www.undp.org/eurasia/stories/ukraine-tackling-mine-action-all-sides-make-land-safe-again/.

[14] Chaika, “War in Ukraine”; UN Development Programme, “In Ukraine, Tackling Mine Action for All Sides.” See also, “A Hungry World: How the Ukraine War Worsens a Global Food Crisis.”

[15] Farmer, “Ukraine’s Landmine Crisis”; UN Development Programme, “In Ukraine, Tackling Mine Action for All Sides.”

[16] Helene Cooper, “Ukraine Fires British Long-Range Missiles into Russia,” New York Times, November 20, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/20/us/politics/ukraine-russia-uk-storm-shadow-missiles.html.  

[17] Marc Santora, Lara Jakes, Valerie Hopkins, Andrew E. Kramer, and Eric Schmitt, “With Use of New Missile, Russia Sends a Threatening Message to the West,” New York Times, November 21, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/21/world/europe/russia-ballistic-missile-ukraine-war.html.

[18] Lara Jakes, “How Soon Could Ukraine’s Forces ‘Start to Buckle’ Without U.S. Weapons?” New York Times, March 5, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/05/world/americas/ukraine-us-weapons-suspension.html; Will Weissert, Zeke Miller and Aamer Madhani, “Zelenskyy Leaves White House without Signing Minerals Deal after Oval Office Blowup,” Associated Press, February 28, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/zelenskyy-security-guarantees-trump-meeting-washington-eebdf97b663c2cdc9e51fa346b09591d;

[19] Al Jazeera, “Starmer Says ‘Coalition of the Willing’ to Present Ukraine Peace Plan to US,” March 2, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/2/european-leaders-gather-in-london-to-strengthen-support-for-ukraine.

[20] Andrew E. Kramer and Alan Rappeport, “Ukraine Supports 30-Day Cease-Fire as U.S. Says It Will Resume Military Aid,” New York Times, March 11, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/11/world/europe/ukraine-us-saudi-cease-fire-talks.html.

[21] BBC, “Trump Says He’s Considering Fresh Sanctions and Tariffs on Russia,” March 7, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/live/cg70jylp32gt?post=asset%3A87f377ab-8e28-43c0-ac22-e15dc2e9c0f5#post.

[22] See “The Danger of Russian Instability: The Wagner Group Uprising and Its Significance.”

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